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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
These appeals comprise the latest installment in a series 
of legal skirmishes waged between the gr oup known as 
 
                                2 
  
"The Rainbow Family" or "The Rainbow Family of Light" and 
the United States Forest Service. Garrick Beck, Joan Kalb, 
and Stephen Sedlacko, participants in a 1999 Rainbow 
Family gathering, appeal from Judgments in Criminal 
Cases entered following the conviction of each of a 
misdemeanor violation of 36 C.F.R. S 261.10(k): "Use or 
occupancy of National Forest System land or facilities 
without special-use authorization when such authorization 
is required." These appellants challenge the Forest Service 
regulations, arguing that the relevant regulations do not 
apply to them as individuals and, in the alter native, that 
the regulations are constitutionally infirm both facially and 
as applied. Because we are convinced that the challenged 
regulations were properly applied to the individual 
appellants and do not transgress constitutional 
requirements, we will affirm the Judgments in a Criminal 
Case entered by the District Court. 
 
I. 
 
The facts underlying this appeal are set forth in detail in 
the opinion of the District Court, United States v. Kalb, 86 
F. Supp. 2d 509 (W.D. Pa. 2000). Accor dingly, our 
recounting of the facts is brief. For a period of weeks during 
the summer of 1999, some 20,000 people attended a 
Rainbow Family1 gathering in Pennsylvania's Allegheny 
National Forest. Each of the appellants was pr esent at that 
gathering and was identified by a Forest Service criminal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Rainbow Family has been described in other litigation as: 
 
       . . . an unincorporated, loosely structured gr oup of individuals 
that 
       regularly gathers in undeveloped sites in National Forests to pray 
for 
       peace, discuss environmental and other contemporary political and 
       social issues, and [to] exchange, develop, express and demonstrate 
       their ideas and views. Annual gatherings have occurr ed in 
different 
       National Forests on and around July 4 since 1972. These gatherings 
       draw more than 20,000 participants and last for a month or more. 
       Smaller regional gatherings take place thr oughout the year in 
       National Forests across the country. 
 
Black v. Arthur, 18 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1130 (D. Or. 1988), aff 'd, 201 
F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (inter nal citations omitted). 
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investigator as having had some role in or ganizing or 
administering the event. 
 
In early July 1999, these three individuals wer e issued 
citations charging each with use of For est Service land 
without special use authorization in violation of 36 C.F.R. 
S 261.10(k).2 Related r egulations provide that such "special 
use authorization" must be obtained for "noncommercial 
group uses." Id. S 251.50."Special uses" include all uses 
other than timber harvesting, grazing and mineral 
extraction. Id. "Group use" is defined as "an activity 
conducted on National Forest System lands that involves a 
group of 75 or more people, either as participants or 
spectators." Id. S 251.51. 
 
The application for a permit is a simple one-page 
document which essentially requires the applicant to 
supply information concerning the location and description 
of the National Forest System land upon which the activity 
will take place, the facilities that the applicant seeks to use, 
the estimated number of participants and spectators, the 
starting and ending times and dates for the pr oposed 
activity, and the name of an adult who will sign a special 
use authorization on behalf of the applicant. Id. S 251.54. 
 
Each of the appellants was advised by a Forest Service 
representative of the need for the Rainbow Family to apply 
for a special use permit and was asked to sign the permit 
application. Each refused. 
 
In August 1999, the appellants were char ged with 
violating the Forest Service regulations and, after a two-day 
bench trial in October 1999, each were found guilty. On 
June 1, 2000, each of the appellants was sentenced to a 
three-month term of imprisonment and was directed to pay 
a special assessment. A $500 fine was assessed against two 
of the appellants.3 These sentences were stayed pending the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. A number of Forest Service regulations were recodified in 1999. These 
changes altered the numbering of relevant sections. Because the District 
Court and the parties have consistently referr ed to these regulations by 
their original numbers, we do the same. 
 
3. The penalty provision of the regulatory scheme, 36 C.F.R. S 261.1b 
provides that: 
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filing and resolution of any appeal. These timely appeals 
followed and were consolidated for disposition. 
 
II. 
 
The appellants raise a number of challenges to the 
Judgments entered against them. We consider these 
challenges seriatim, mindful that because of the"many 
legal contests between the Rainbow Family and the Forest 
Service," we do not write on a blank slate. Kalb, 86 F. 
Supp. 2d at 517. 
 
We address first the contention that the regulations 
underlying the appellants' convictions criminalize only 
group rather than individual conduct: "This statute has no 
actus reus element that can be committed by an 
individual." 
 
We reject this position because it is unnecessary that the 
statute specifically set forth the individual as the actor as 
opposed to the group; the statute need not begin "No 
person shall . . ." (as appellants argue) for individual 
liability to attach to a violation. The liability of an individual 
-- or a group -- occurs when the four r equirements of the 
statute are proven. 
 
Not one court considering the application of 36 C.F .R. 
S 261.10(b) has hesitated to apply that section to individual 
defendants. We are not persuaded to chart a different 
course here. In rejecting the appellants' argument, we are 
guided by the opinion in United States v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 
892 (4th Cir. 1998). There, the court clarified that proof of 
a violation of section 261.10(k) 
 
       requires the government to demonstrate: 1) use, 2) of 
       National Forest land, 3) by a noncommerical gr oup of 
       75 or more persons, either as participants or 
       spectators, 4) without special use authorization. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
        Any violation of the prohibitions of this part (261) shall be 
       punished by a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for not 
       more than six months or both pursuant to title 16 U.S.C. section 
       551, unless otherwise provided. 
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Id. at 894. The record demonstrates that these 
requirements were satisfied with r espect to each of the 
appellants. Each knew of the permit requirement, that the 
gathering of which they were a part was lar ge enough to 
implicate that requirement,4  and that an application for a 
permit had not been made. Armed with that knowledge, 
these individuals could have avoided liability under the 
regulations by opting not to participate in the gathering on 
National Forest land where it was clear that a special use 
authorization was required and had not been granted. The 
record is devoid of any indication that it was "imperative for 
[the] Rainbow Family to gather in a national forest, as 
opposed to some other location, to pray and to discuss their 
views." United States v. Linick, 195 F .3d 538, 543 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
 
To read the regulation and the penalty for its violation as 
inapplicable to individuals who use the National For est 
System as part of a group, with deliberate disr egard for the 
group permit requirement, would effectively eviscerate the 
special use authorization process. We decline to do so. 
 
III. 
 
The appellants next attack particular aspects of the 
regulations on constitutional grounds, ar guing first that the 
regulations are impermissibly vague and overbroad because 
they fail to establish standards for the public and for those 
enforcing the regulations "sufficient to guard against the 
arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests." City of Chicago v. 
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999). 
 
"It is established that a law fails to meet the 
requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague 
and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to 
the conduct it prohibits. . . ." Id. at 56 (quoting Giaccio v. 
Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402, 403 (1966)). The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The appellants do not contend that they wer e not part of the "group" 
that used the forest. Thus, this is not a case in which an individual is 
charged under the regulation simply because he or she happened to be 
in the same location with 75 or more persons who belonged to a "group" 
of which the individual is not a part. 
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regulations here do not foster uncertainty. Unlike the 
ordinance at issue in Morales, the r egulations clearly define 
what conduct is prohibited; there is no need for speculation.5 
Accordingly, we reject appellants' allegation that the 
regulatory scheme is unconstitutionally vague. 
 
IV. 
 
The appellants next contend that the regulation 
requirement that a special use authorization permit be 
signed by a member of the group burdens the First 
Amendment rights of individuals attending a Rainbow 
Family gathering. According to the appellants,"[t]he 
challenged regulation is unconstitutional because it is not 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
purpose nor does it leave open ample alternate channels of 
communication." By now there is a body of caselaw 
addressing the constitutionality of the signature 
requirement; this requirement has been upheld uniformly 
and we will uphold it here. 
 
Even where expressive conduct takes place in a public 
forum, the government may impose reasonable "time, place 
and manner" restrictions on that conduct. United States v. 
Johnson, 159 F.3d at 895 (citing W ard v. Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789 (1989)). These r estrictions 
comport with constitutional requirements if they (1) are 
content neutral; (2) are "narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest," and (3) "leave open 
ample alternative channels for communication of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Supreme Court in Morales considered the constitutionality of 
Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance. This ordinance prohibited 
" `criminal street gang members' fr om `loitering' with one another or 
with 
other persons in any public place." 527 U.S. at 45-56. "Loitering" was 
defined as "remain[ing] in any one place with no apparent purpose." Id. 
at 47. The ordinance was void for vagueness where "[i]t [was] difficult to 
imagine how any citizen of the city of Chicago standing in a public place 
with a group of people would know if he or she had an `apparent 
purpose.' " Id. at 56-57. "[T]he vagueness that doom[ed] this ordinance 
[was] not the product of uncertainty about the normal meaning of 
`loitering,' but rather about what loitering[was] covered by the ordinance 
and what [was] not." Id. at 57. The regulations challenged here are not 
subject to the same uncertainty; the prohibition is clearly delineated. 
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information." Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. The appellants do not 
dispute that the signature requirement is content neutral. 
They argue instead that the requir ement is not narrowly 
tailored and that it forecloses alter native channels of 
communication. 
 
These appellants represent that they and other 
participants in the Rainbow gatherings meet as "individuals 
who admit of no structure for leadership or hierarchy of 
decision-making." They then contend that the"refusal of 
the Government, through the guise of this permit scheme, 
to permit large groups of individuals to gather on Forest 
Service land, without first organizing and thereafter 
delegating authority, is unduly burdensome." According to 
appellants, any government interest served by the permit 
process "can all be fully served by a system which assesses 
proposed land uses on a case-by-case basis but does not 
require an agent for the group to sign a special use 
authorization." In essence, the appellants would have us 
hold that in order to satisfy the requir ement that a 
restriction on activity protected by the First Amendment be 
narrowly tailored, the government is required to omit the 
signature requirement from the permit scheme. We 
disagree. 
 
The Supreme Court makes clear in War d that in order to 
pass constitutional muster, a time, place and manner 
restriction need not be the "least r estrictive means" of 
vindicating the government's interest. See 491 U.S. at 789- 
97. Instead it is only necessary that the gover nment "could 
reasonably have determined that its inter ests overall would 
be served less effectively without [the r egulation] than with 
it." Id. at 801. That certainly is the case here. 
 
The interests vindicated by the regulatory scheme in 
general were detailed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit in Johnson: 
 
       The regulations, as well as the Department of 
       Agriculture's comments accompanying them make 
       clear that the regulations serve three purposes. They 
       are designed to (1) "protect resources and 
       improvements on National Forest System lands," (2) 
       "allocate space among potential or existing uses and 
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       activities," and (3) "address concer ns of public health 
       and safety." 
 
159 F.3d at 895 (quoting 60 Fed. Reg. 45,258, 45,262 
(1995)). The Court then concluded that: 
 
       The permit requirement serves these three goals in a 
       narrowly tailored manner by providing a minimally 
       intrusive system to notify Forest Service personnel of 
       any large groups that will be using the forest so that 
       the personnel, through advance preparation, can 
       minimize any damage that may occur. 
 
Id. 
 
That the interests served by the signatur e requirement in 
particular would be served less effectively were that 
requirement eliminated has also been r ecognized. We agree 
with the reasoning of the District Court in United States v. 
Masel, 54 F. Supp. 2d 903, 919 (W .D. Wis. 1999): 
 
       With respect to the signature r equirement, requiring an 
       individual to sign a special use authorization as a 
       representative of the group is necessary to ensure that 
       the group will be responsible for the actions of its 
       members as a whole, to give the authorization legal 
       effect and to subject the group to the authorization's 
       terms and conditions. Without the ability to impose 
       terms and conditions on all members of a gr oup, the 
       government would clearly be extremely hampered in its 
       ability to achieve any of its interests. The terms and 
       conditions of a group use permit would have little teeth 
       if they only applied to the individual who signed the 
       permit. 
 
Based on these analyses of the interests served by the 
regulatory scheme generally and the signatur e requirement 
in particular, we are convinced that the regulations are 
sufficiently "narrowly tailored" to serve legitimate 
government interests. 
 
We are similarly convinced that imposition of the 
signature requirement "leave[s] open ample alternative 
channels for communication." War d, 491 U.S. at 791. The 
regulation does not preclude the use of state or private 
property for Rainbow Family gatherings. It also does not 
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impinge upon the right of the Rainbow Family to meet on 
federal land which does not fall within Forest Service 
jurisdiction or to gather in groups made up of fewer than 
75 individuals. Again, we agree with the District Court's 
conclusion in United States v. Masel: 
 
       The Rainbow Family has a choice; if it does not wish to 
       perform an act that is antithetical to its core belief [ -- 
       designating a representative to sign a per mit 
       application --] it can hold its gatherings in an area that 
       does not have a permit requirement. 
 
54 F. Supp. 2d at 918. 
 
Because we find that the challenged signatur e 
requirement represents a r easonable time, place and 
manner restriction on expressive conduct, we reject the 
appellants' argument that the requir ement transgresses the 
guarantees of the First Amendment.6 
 
V. 
 
We turn next to the appellants' challenge to that portion 
of the regulatory scheme authorizing the For est Service to 
attach terms and conditions to the grant of a permit. The 
appellants contend that 36 C.F.R. S 251.56 is 
unconstitutionally overbroad in that it confers"unbridled 
discretion" upon representatives of the Forest Service.7 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We reject, too, the appellants' claim that it was "legally impossible" 
for 
them to sign a special use authorization. The appellants maintain that 
because they are merely associated with the Rainbow Family on a loose 
voluntary basis and lack authority to act on behalf of the group, they 
cannot sign a special use permit. This ar gument has been raised many 
times but has never been credited. To r ecognize the appellant's claim of 
legal impossibility would permit groups, however loosely-organized, to 
"maintain a fiction that they have no leaders or agents" and thereby to 
undercut the special use authorization pr ocess. United States v. Masel, 
54 F. Supp. 2d at 920. "[B]ecause the attendees at the gathering could 
have designated [appellants] as [persons] who would sign the permit on 
behalf of the group without breaking any laws, it was not legally 
`impossible' for [them] to sign the per mit." Id. 
 
7. This provision reads: 
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appellants challenge the facial validity of these r egulations; 
because the appellants did not apply for and did not receive 
a special use permit, the regulatory pr ovisions at issue 
were never applied to them. 
 
In evaluating this argument we are guided by the 
Supreme Court's admonition that "the doctrine of 
overbreadth is appropriately applied in a facial challenge 
only where `the enactment reaches a substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected conduct. If it does not, then the 
overbreadth challenge must fail.' " Kreimer v. Bureau of 
Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1265 (3d Cir . 1992) (quoting Village 
of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 
U.S. 489, 494 (1982)). "Accordingly, `there must be a 
realistic danger that the [regulation] itself will significantly 
compromise recognized First Amendment pr otections of 
parties not before the Court for it to be facially challenged 
on overbreadth grounds.' " Id.  (quoting Members of City 
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801 (1984)). 
"[A] litigant must establish something mor e than a mere 
possibility that a particular grant of discr etion might be 
used unconstitutionally in some other setting." Gannett 
Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Berger, 894 F.2d 61, 66 (3d 
Cir. 1990). 
 
In Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 
751 (1988), the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test 
governing when a First Amendment facial challenge may be 
made to an allegedly overbroad licensing scheme. First, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       (a) General. Each special use authorization must contain: 
 
       (ii) Such terms and conditions as the authorized officer deems 
       necessary to (A) Protect Federal property and economic interests; 
(B) 
       Manage efficiently the lands subject to the use or adjacent 
thereto; 
       (C) Protect other lawful users of the land adjacent to or occupied 
by 
       such use: (D) Protect lives and property; (E) Protect the interests 
of 
       individuals living in the general area of the use who rely on the 
fish, 
       wildlife, and other biotic resources of the area for subsistence 
       purposes; (F) Require siting to cause the least damage to the 
       environment, taking into consideration feasibility and other 
relevant 
       factors; and (G) Otherwise protect the public interest. 
 
As we have noted, the numbering of this section was amended in 1999. 
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regulation must confer upon a governmental official or 
agency "substantial power to discriminate based on the 
content or viewpoint of speech by suppressing disfavored 
speech or disliked speakers." 486 U.S. at 759. Second, 
"[t]he law must have a close enough nexus to expression, or 
to conduct commonly associated with expression, to pose a 
real and substantial threat of the identified censorship 
risks." Id.8 
 
The appellants contend that the terms and conditions 
portion of the special use regulatory scheme, 36 C.F.R. 
S 251.56, is subject to facial challenge under the test 
announced in Lakewood because the br oad discretion 
granted to the Forest Service could, at some future point, 
be used to chill protected speech by gr oups with disfavored 
political or social views. The appellants focus particularly 
on language in the regulation which per mits the Forest 
Service to impose upon a special use permit terms and 
conditions deemed necessary "to protect the public 
interest." We have reviewed the terms and conditions 
provision against the background of the caselaw and are 
convinced that this provision does not satisfy the facial 
challenge requirements set forth in Lakewood. 
 
We consider first the relationship between the terms and 
conditions provision and expressive conduct, and conclude 
that any relationship is, at best, incidental. Section 251.56 
"does not target First Amendment activities." Masel, 54 
F. Supp. 2d at 912. It is "not dir ected narrowly and 
specifically at expression or conduct commonly associated 
with expression." Id. 
 
The terms and conditions provision does not permit the 
Forest Service to ban disfavored speech. Moreover, it is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Supreme Court has left open the issue of whether an individual 
should be allowed to mount a facial challenge on the basis of unguided 
discretion in regulating the manner  of speech, instead of excessive 
discretion in regulating whether speech should be prohibited altogether. 
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989) ("Since 
respondent does not claim that city officials enjoy unguided discretion to 
deny the right to speak altogether, it is open to question whether 
respondent's claim falls within the narr ow class of permissible facial 
challenges to allegedly unconstrained grants of r egulatory authority."). 
 
                                12 
  
applicable to every special use authorization; the clause 
does not single out a "particular group, activity, or conduct 
but is directed at all uses of the National For est." Id. at 
912-13. Groups seeking to use the national for ests for 
traditionally expressive purposes such as assemblies, 
meetings, demonstrations and parades need not obtain 
special use authorization and are not subject to the terms 
and conditions provision unless their numbers r each or 
exceed 75. The special use authorization scheme in general 
and the terms and conditions provision in particular are 
"directed not at expression, but at the congregation of large 
numbers of people in the forest." Id.  at 913. When the 
provision is triggered, it applies with equal force to 
recreational, expressive and all other special uses of the 
forest. "Thus, the regulation is closer to a law of general 
application." Id. at 914. "In this case, the `terms and 
conditions' provision `provide[s] too blunt a censorship 
instrument to warrant judicial intervention prior to an 
allegation of actual misuse.' " Id. at 913 (quoting Lakewood, 
486 U.S. at 761). 
 
Although we acknowledge that there is some theoretical 
possibility that the "terms and conditions" provision could 
be invoked to chill protected speech, we ar e not persuaded 
that "[t]he risk that Forest Service officials will use 
nefariously any discretion afforded to them by the . . . 
provision is . . . great enough to justify invoking the 
`extraordinary doctrine' that permits facial challenges." Id. 
at 914 (quoting Ward, 481 U.S. at 794). 
 
Our position with respect to the first pr ong of the 
Lakewood test is similar to that adopted by the District 
Court in Masel: 
 
       [S]pecial uses cover virtually the entir e spectrum of 
       outdoor activities, the majority of which have nothing 
       to do with protected expression. In the absence of 
       empirical evidence demonstrating that a significant 
       proportion of the special use authorizations granted by 
       the Forest Service each year are for speech-related 
       activities, there is no basis to conclude that the terms 
       and conditions provision presents a substantial 
       opportunity for censorship on an ongoing basis. 
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54 F. Supp. 2d at 913-14. We thus hold that appellants 
may not make a facial challenge to the regulation. 
 
In the interest of completeness, we note that even were 
we to entertain such a challenge, we would r eject it on the 
merits because the regulation, as interpr eted by the 
National Forest Service, specifically limits the discretion of 
the Forest Service to impose conditions dir ected at 
curtailing or censoring expression. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 
45,262 (1995). "In evaluating the constitutionality of a 
regulatory scheme, we should `presume any narrowing 
construction . . . to which the law is `fairly susceptible.' " 
195 F.3d 538, 542 (quoting Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 770 
n.11). 
 
As we have noted, the argument that the ter ms and 
conditions provisions of the regulation is purposely vague, 
giving the Forest Service the ability to invoke health and 
safety concerns as a pretext for censoring expressive 
activity, is not a novel one. Since 1995, the For est Service 
has consistently taken the position that discr etion granted 
to it under the regulations may only be used to further the 
government's threefold interest in r egulating non- 
commercial group use of forest land: (1) "protect[ing] 
resources and improvements on National Forest System 
lands;" (2) "allocat[ing] space among potential or existing 
uses or activities;" and (3) "addressing concerns of public 
health and safety." 60 Fed. Reg. at 45,262 (1995). We agree 
with the District Court writing in United States v. 
McFadden, 71 F. Supp. 2d 962 (W.D. Mo. 1999), that the 
regulation authorizing the Forest Service to impose terms 
and conditions "necessary to protect the public interest" 
 
       passes constitutional muster, particularly because the 
       Forest Service has specifically identified the "public 
       interests" it seeks to protect . . . .[T]erms and 
       conditions may only be imposed to protect one of the 
       delineated interests. Specifically, "ter ms and conditions 
       that the Forest Service may impose in a per mit are 
       limited to those designed to assure compliance with 
       otherwise applicable health and safety standar ds; to 
       minimize damage to water quality, fish, wildlife, and 
       other environmental aspects of the forests; and to 
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       protect the physical safety of all those in the National 
       Forest System." 
 
Id. at 965.9 We agree, too with the District Court's finding 
that: 
 
       Regardless of . . . efforts to describe the terms and 
       conditions provision attached to a special use permit 
       as potentially onerous and oppressive . . . the 
       regulations . . . limit the permitting official's discretion 
       in an objective, constitutionally sound manner . 
 
Id. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the appellants' facial challenge 
fails. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In 1999, the Forest Service promulgated an interpretive rule clarifying 
the scope of 36 C.F.R. S 251.56. See 64 Fed. Reg. 48,959 (1999). This 
interpretive rule, which essentially embraced the holding in United States 
v. McFadden, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 962, r eads in relevant part: 
 
       The imposition of terms and conditions in noncommercial group use 
       permits is limited to those designed to further the three public 
       interests identified by the Forest Service in promulgating the 
       noncommercial group rule . . . . 
 
We are aware that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in 
United States v. Linick that, prior to issuance of this interpretive rule, 
the 
terms and conditions portion of the special use authorization scheme 
could have been invoked to attach conditions to the use of a public 
forum in advance of actual expression and was, as a result, "facially 
invalid." 195 F.3d at 542. The court concluded that the interpretive rule 
preserved the constitutionality of the scheme because the scheme, as 
limited by the rule, satisfied the criteria applicable to a permissible 
"time-place-manner regulation" of expr essive activity. Id. at 543. 
 
The court, however, dismissed the infor mation filed against Linick and 
other defendants alleging a violation of 36 C.F .R. S 261.10(k), reasoning 
that, because the conduct alleged took place in 1998 and the interpretive 
rule was not promulgated until September 1999,"[t]he regulation . . . 
gave the Defendants inadequate notice about the danger of being 
successfully prosecuted under this newly and narrowly construed 
regulatory scheme." Id. at 544. 
 
As we have explained, we do not agree with the Court in Linick that 
the terms and conditions portion of the r egulatory scheme is 
constitutionally infirm under the criteria set forth in Lakewood. 
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VI. 
 
In a related argument, the appellants contend that the 
special use authorization scheme is subject to a facial 
challenge and is unconstitutional because it impinges upon 
First Amendment rights by not providing for immediate 
judicial review of overly restrictive sear ch-related terms and 
conditions which theoretically could be attached to the 
grant of a permit. The government disagr ees, arguing that, 
under the regulations, immediate judicial r eview is available 
to challenge the imposition of terms and conditions: "The 
Forest Service does not believe that it can r equire 
exhaustion [of administrative remedies] in the 
noncommercial group context." 
 
The government's interpretation of its own regulations is 
entitled to controlling weight, and this particular 
interpretation has been adopted by at least one court. See, 
e.g., United States v. McFadden, 71 F . Supp. 2d 962, 966 
(W.D. Mo. 1999) (upholding government r eading of 
regulations to permit applicants or special use permit to go 
"directly to court" to challenge ter ms and conditions 
attached to permit.) Appellants do not cite caselaw to the 
contrary. 
 
We are convinced that the government's construction of 
the relevant regulations is reasonable and that the judicial 
review provisions of the regulatory are not constitutionally 
infirm. 
 
VII. 
 
Because we are convinced that the special use 
authorization scheme was properly applied to these 
individuals and is constitutional both on its face and as it 
was applied here, we will affirm each of the Judgments in 
this Criminal Case. 
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